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420 NoRRIS v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY Co. [39 C.2d 
missible, '' [ e] vidence must correspond with the substance of 
the material allegations, and be relevant to the question in 
dispute." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1868.) "Irrelevant matter, 
though pleaded, is still irrelevant.'' (Crowell v. City of River-
side, 26 Cal.App.2d 566, 583 [80 P.2d 120].) [14] The 
materiality of evidence is a question of law and a wide dis-
cretion is left to the trial judge in determining its admissi-
bility. (Spolter v. Fottr-Wheel Brake Serv. Co., 99 Cal.App. 
2d 690, 699 [222 P.2d 307] ; Moody v. Peirano, 4 Cal.App. 
411, 418 [ 88 P. 380] . ) His ruling thereon, in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed upon appeal. 
(Estate of Ades, 81 Cal.App.2d 334, 342 [184 P.2d 1] .) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
[L. A. No. 22066. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1952.] 
DAVID MORGAN NORRIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY (a Corporation), 
Respondent; ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT AND 
LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Cross-Defend-
ant and Appellant. 
[la, lb] Automobiles- Insurance- Persons Included in Omnibus 
Clause.-Under omnibus clause of insurance policy issued to 
owner of automobile declaring that word "insured" includes 
the named insured, any person while using the car and any 
person or organization legally responsible for use thereof, 
provided the actual use is by the named insured or with his 
permission, a companion of the owner's son driving the car 
with the permission of such son at the time it collided with 
another vehicle is not an additional insured, where the owner 
had given his son permission to use the car but expressly 
prohibited him from lending it or permitting its use by any 
other person except a member of the family or the chauffeur, 
the matter of the owner's imputed liability under Veh. Code, 
§ 402, not being involved in the case. 
:McK. Dig. Reference: [1-6] Automobiles, § 68-1. 
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[2] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Use of 
automobile by a third person is not protected by an omnibus 
clause in an insurance policy where the owner has expressly 
forbidden it. 
[3] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-A per-
mittee's delegation of permission for use of an automobile 
without the express or implied permission of the insured is not 
within the omnibus coverage of an automobile liability policy 
unless the third party's operation of the car serves some 
purpose of the. original permittee. 
[4] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Where 
a permittee in his operation of an automobile used the vehicle 
contrary to instructions or where against instructions he gave 
the operation over to another for the permittee's benefit, the 
permittee is the person responsible for the operation of the 
vehicle with permission and therefore an insured under the 
omnibus clause of an automobile liability policy. 
[5] !d.-Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Where 
there was a course of conduct indicating assent by the insured 
to use of automobile by others than the permittee, the user 
is deemed to be the responsible person with permission and 
an additional insured under the omnibus clause of an automo-
bile liability policy. 
[6] Id.~Insurance-Persons Included in Omnibus Clause.-Where 
the facts show neither express nor implied permission for the 
permittee's delegation of the use of an automobile to another, 
the third person is not the responsible person with permission 
and therefore not protected by the omnibus clause of an 
automobile liability policy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action on an automobile insurance policy. Judgment for 
defendant affirmed. 
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and Raymond G. Stan-
bury for Appellants. 
[2] Omnibus clause of automobile liability policy as covering 
accidents caused by third person who is using car with consent 
of permittee of named insured, note, 160 A.L.R. 1195, 1209. Per-
mission or consent to employee's use of car within meaning of 
omnibus coverage clause, note, 5 A.L.R.2d 600, 657. See, also, 
Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Automobiles, § 96; Am.Jur., Automobiles, 
§ 534 et seq. 
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,Jennings & Belcher, Stevens l<'argo and Louis E. Kearney 
for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-David Morgan Norris and Irvin Victor Nor-
ris are father and minor son. They are or are about to be 
defendants in an action to recover damages for personal in-
juries and property damage sustained by Mr. and Mrs. Leo 
Phillipson in an automobile accident. At the time of the 
accident the plaintiff Irvin was driving a Plymouth auto-
mobile owned by E. A. Parkford. This action is for declara-
tory relief to determine the respective rights and duties of 
the plaintiffs and the defendant Pacific Indemnity Company, 
herein called Pacific, under the insurance policy issued by 
it to the owner Parkford. Pacific cross-complained against 
the plaintiffs and against Zurich General Accident and Lia-
bility Insurance Company, insurer of the senior Norris who 
signed Irvin's application for an operator's license (V eh. 
Code, § 352) . 
The facts as found by the court are based on evidence 
which is without substantial conflict. Parkford had given 
his son, Geoffrey, permission to use the Plymouth but ex-
pressly prohibited him from lending it to or permitting its 
use by any other person except a member of the family or 
the chauffeur. On April 3, 1950, Geoffrey and Irvin went 
to Newport Beach in the Plymouth. While they were at a 
friend's home Irvin wanted to borrow a car to drive to the 
nearby town for a haircut. Geoffrey had not previously 
loaned the Plymouth to anyone, but upon request he gave 
Irvin the keys saying, "Irv, I am not supposed to loan the 
car. For God's sake, be careful." When Irvin left the barber 
shop in the Plymouth to meet the other boys, he collided with 
an automobile in which the Phillipsons were riding. 
The question before the trial court was whether Irvin was 
an additional assured under the policy of Pacific which was 
introduced in evidence; and therefore whether Pacific was 
obligated to answer for a judgment as against him and to 
defend the personal injury action on his behalf. The trial 
court found that Irvin did not have the permission of the 
owner express or implied and concluded that he was not 
an additional assured. Judgment followed for Pacific on 
the complaint and the cross-complaint accordingly. The plain-
tiffs and cross-defendants appealed. 
The appeal presents the question of the correctness of the 
trial court's declaration that Irvin was not an additional 
Aug.1952] NoRRIS v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY Co. 
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assured under Pacific's policy. For the purpose of deter-
mining that issue the correctness of the finding that Geoffrey 
had no authority to loan the automobile, in fact was expressly 
prohibited from doing so, and therefore that Irvin had no 
actual permission of the owner, is unquestioned. 
The so-called omnibus clause of the policy issued to the 
owner by Pacific provides that "the unqualified word 'in-
sured' includes the named insured and also includes any 
person while using the automobile and any person or organiza-
tion legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual 
use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his 
permission.'' 
No difficulty arises as to the meaning of the word "per-
mission" in the policy. It may be assumed that it means 
permission, express or implied. (See Veh. Code, § 415a(2).) 
The problem involves the application of the policy provision. 
The plaintiffs contend that the omnibus clause attaches to 
fix liability on the insurer in this case, as the statutory pro-
vision attached to fix the owner's imputed liability under 
section 402 of the Vehicle Code in Souza v. Corti (1943), 22 
Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861]. 
Section 402 of the Vehicle Code provides that every owner 
of a motor vehicle is liable for death or injury to person or 
property resulting from negligence in the operation of the 
vehicle by any person using or operating it with the owner's 
permission express or implied, and that the negligence of 
such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes 
of civil damages. The section places a limitation of $5,000/ 
10,000 public liability and $1,000 property damage in one 
accident. 
In Souza v. Corti, supra, Arthur Gigli had permission to 
use his father's ,Dodge automobile. In violation of instruc-
tions prohibiting the use or operation of the car by another, 
he delegated operation thereof to the defendant Corti. In 
a personal injury action against Corti and the Giglis, father 
and son, judgment was rendered against Corti alone and 
in favor of the other defendants. The appeal of the plain-
tiffs involved the correctness of the implied finding that there 
was no imputed liability of the owner pursuant to section 
402 of the Vehicle Code. In reversing the judgment as to 
the Giglis this court used the following language (22 Cal.2d 
at pp. 460-461) : "In the present case the use which was 
being made of the borrowed car at the time of the accident 
424 NoRRIS v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY Co. [39 C.2d 
was the use which was contemplated by the owner. Any secret 
restrictions imposed by him on the manner of its use do not 
negative the controlling fact that it was being used with the 
owner's permission at the time of the accident. Violations 
of such restrictions may not be said to cause a revocation 
of the permission. Liability of the defendant owner in this 
case pursuant to section 402 of the Vehicle Code is. there-
fore established. . . . 
''As to the liability of the defendant Arthur Gigli, the 
record shows that defendant Corti took possession of the 
Dodge for the use, benefit and accommodation and under the 
direction of Arthur and for the purpose of taking it to Rocca's 
for Arthur. Under these circumstances Arthur was the prin-
cipal and Corti was his agent. The negligence of the latter 
was therefore imputable to Arthur. (Maberto v. Wolfe, 106 
Cal.App. 202 [289 P. 218] .) " 
Thus in the Souza case the owner's permittee, Arthur Gigli, 
was held to have been the user of the car with the owner's 
permission at the time of the injury to the plaintiff. 
[la] Section 402 is not involved in the present case. The 
plaintiffs are not concerned with fastening imputed liability 
on the owner. They are not the beneficiaries of any statutory 
created liability. The plaintiffs seek to apply the policy lan-
guage as a source of financial discharge of Irvin's liability 
to the persons injured through his own negligence. But 
Irvin's financial protection of his ability to discharge his 
liability for his negligent acts is his own concern unless his 
use or operation of the automobile was with the express or 
implied permission of the owner. Unquestionably as found 
by the court Irvin did not have the permission of the owner, 
either express or implied, for the use or operation of the 
car. Protection under an owner's insurance policy to the 
user or operator of the owner's automobile depends on his 
having obtained the express or implied permission of the 
owner. 
The contract language is plain. The plaintiffs would never-
theless apply the determination in Souza v. Corti, supra, as 
it may affect an owner's imputed liability, to obtain coverage 
under the owner's policy for one who was not his permittee. 
As support for this position they invoke the principle that 
in construing insurance contracts the words expressing the 
intention of the parties should be given a meaning settled 
by judicial decision. The invoked principle applies to judicial 
construction of insurance policies. (Appleman, Insurance 
Aug. 1952] NoRRis v. PAciFIC INDEMNITY Co. 
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I .. aw & Practice, vol. 13, § 7404, p. 104 et seq.; Fidelity & 
Cas. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 1, 7 
[100 P.2d 364].) 'l'he invoked rule, insofar as it is applicable, 
produces an interpretation of the word "permission" to in-
clude permission, express or implied. But it does not make 
one a permittee who had neither the express nor implied per-
mission of the owner for the use or operation of the auto-
mobile. 
'l'here is no decision in this state which construes or applies 
similar language in insurance policies in accordance with the 
plaintiff's contentions. Nor do decisions in other jurisdic-
tions relied on justify a conclusion that Irvin is an addi-
tional assured under the owner's policy. 
[2] It is held generally that the use by a third person is 
not protected by an omnibus clause in an insurance policy 
where the owner has expressly forbidden it. (Samuels v. 
AmeTican Auto Ins. Co., 150 F.2d 221 [160 A.L.R. 1191], 
and annotation p. 1195 at 1209, et seq., and cases cited; note, 
5 A.L.R.2d 657 and cases cited.) [3] The weight of au-
thority is said to follow the rule that a permittee's delegation 
of permission for the use of the car without the express or 
implied permission of the assured is not within the omnibus 
coverage unless the third party's operation of the car serves 
some purpose of the original permittee. (5 Am.Jur., Auto-
mobiles § 535.1 Cum.Supp. p. 155, and references; see, also, 
CaTd v. CommeTcial Cas. Ins. Co., 20 Tenn.App. 132 [95 
S.W.2d 1281] ; AmeTican Auto Ins. Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 
605 [45 S.W.2d 52]; Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wn.2d 533 [197 
P.2d 999] .) [4] Where the permittee in his operation used 
the vehicle contrary to instructions or where against instruc-
tions he gave the operation over to another for the permittee's 
benefit, the courts have held the permittee to be the person 
responsible for the operation of the vehicle with permission 
and therefore an assured under the policy. (O'Roak v. Lloyds 
Cas. Co., 285 Mass. 532 [189 N.E. 571]; Guzenfield v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 133 [190 N.E. 23] ; Boudreau v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 287 Mass. 423 [192 N.E. 38] ; Blair v. TTavelers' 
Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 285 [192 N.E. 467] ; State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 186 Va. 658 [43 S.E.2d 863, 5 A.L.R. 
2d 594] ; cf. Dickinson v. G1·eat Am. Indem. Co., 296 Mass. 
368 [6N.E.2d439].) [5] Likewisewheretherewasacourse 
of conduct indicating assent by the assured to use by others 
than the permittee, the user is deemed to be the responsible 
person with permission and an additional assured.· (Odden 
426 NoRRIS v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY Co. 
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v. Union Indern. Co., 156 Wash. 10 [286 P. 59, 72 A.L.R. 
1363]; cf. Trotter v. Union Indern. Co., (D.C.) 33 F.2d 363, 
aff 'd 35 F .2d 104, arising out of the same accident; Boyer 
v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359 [178 N.E. 
523]; Hinton v. Indemn,ity Ins. Co., 175 Va. 205 [8 S.E.2d 
279] .) [6] But where the facts as here showed neither express 
nor implied permission for the permittee's delegation of the use 
of the car to another, the third person has been held not to 
be the responsible person with permission and therefore not 
protected by the omnibus clause. (Johnson v. 0 'Lalor ( 1932), 
279 Mass. 10 [180 N.E. 525]; Moschella v. Kilderry (1935), 
290 Mass. 62 [194 N.E. 728]; Novo v. E'f!'Lployers' Liability 
Assur. Corp. (1936), 295 Mass. 232 [3 N.E~2d 737]; Woznicki 
v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1938), 299 Mass. 244 [12 N.E.2d 876]; 
Kneeland v. Berna1·di (1945), 317 Mass. 517 [58 N.E.2d 823]; 
Locke v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. (1938), 227 
Wis. 489 [279 N.W. 55], and cases cited at p. 58 [of 279 
N.W.].) 
[lb] The plaintiffs urge that an affirmance of the judgment 
would create inconsistency in the construction of language 
under the statutory provisions and under the insurance policy. 
As the foregoing indicates, there is no merit in this conten-
tion. The matter of the owner's imputed liability is not in-
volved here; and the question of the operator's coverage under 
the owner's policy was not involved in the Souza case. Since 
there is neither express nor implied permission for Irvin's 
use of the automobile, he is not protected by the omnibus 
clause in the policy of the owner. 
It follows that the trial court correctly concluded that the 
plaintiff, Irvin Victor Norris, was not an additional assured 
under the omnibus clause of Pacific's policy to Parkford, and 
that this conclusion supports the judgment. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The facts are clear. Parkford owned a Plymouth automo-
bile. His public liability insurance carrier is Pacific Indem-
nity Company, called Pacific. The policy issued by Pacific 
insured, as required by law (Veh. Code,§ 415(a) (2)) in addi-
tion to Parkford "any other person using or responsible for 
the use of [the car] . . . with the express or implied per-
mission of [Parkford]." Parkford permitted his son, Geof-
Aug.1952] NoRRrs v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY Co. 
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frey, to use the car but instructed him not to permit anyone 
else to use it. Geoffrey permitted Irvin Norris to use it, and 
in the course thereof, an injury was caused to the Phillipsons, 
allegedly through Irvin's negligence. Irvin would be liable 
as the driver of the car and the question is whether he was 
operating it with the implied consent or permission of Park-
ford and hence was covered by the insurance policy extend-
ing coverage to persons using the car with Parkford 's con-
sent. That he was covered should be clear. In order to 
give meaning and effect to this court's decision in Souza v. 
Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861], that 
result is imperative. We there considered section 402 of the 
Vehicle Code, which imposes liability upon the owner of a 
vehicle for an injury caused by the negligence of one operat-
ing it with the owner's ''express or implied'' permission. We 
there held, as the majority opinion here concedes, that the 
owner was liable for an injury caused by a person driving 
with the permission of the owner's permittee even though 
the owner had expressly forbidden his permittee to let an-
other operate the car. As stated in the majority opinion, we 
held that ''the liability pursuant to section 402 must be im-
puted to the owner whenever it appeared that there was an 
initial permission for its use although restrictions on delega-
tion of that use were violated.'' To the same effect are Bur-
gess v. Cahill, 26 Cal.2d 320 [158 P.2d 393, 159 A.L.R. 1304] ; 
Herbert v. Cassinelli, 73 Cal.App.2d 277 [166 P.2d 377], and 
Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal.App.2d 392 [44 P.2d 447]. 
I have heretofore stated the terms of the clause of the 
policy here involved. It will be noted that the language is 
identical with that in section 402 considered in the Souza 
and I other cases, supra. It should therefore be given the same 
meaning, and if there is liability on the owner under section 
402, there should likewise be Jiability under the policy. The 
policy was written to meet certain conditions of liability and 
should be interpreted in the light of those conditions. The 
purpose of the policy was to protect another who was oper-
ating the car where he was made responsible by law. Per-
sons who could make the owner liable because they operated 
the car with implied permission under section 402, must neces-
~arily be other persons who, under the policy, are driving 
~with the implied permission of the owner. If the operator 
is said to have implied permission in one case he also has 
it in the other. The law stated in the Souza and other cases, 
428 NoRRIS v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY Co. [39 C.2d 
supra, construing section 402 is read into and becomes a part 
of the policy~the contract for ''. . . all applicable laws in 
existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into 
it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly 
referred to and incorporated in its terms. Section 1656 of 
the Civil Code states that 'All things that in law or usage 
are considered as incidental to a contract, or as necessary 
to carry it into effect, are implied therefrom, unless some of 
them are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things 
of the same class are deemed to be excluded.' Section 1646 
of the Civil Code reads as follows: 'A contract is to be in-
terpreted according to the law and usage of the place where 
it is to be performed; or, if it does not indicate a place of 
performance, according to the law and usage of the place 
where it is made.' Hence, the courts must read as a part 
of a contract the laws of the state existing at the time it was 
made. ' It is to be construed according to the lex loci rei sitae 
as to the sufficiency of its formal execution and as to the 
interpretation of its parts. It would be idle for the parties 
to say, expressly, that they incorporate into their agreement 
the law then existing. The parties are presumed to have 
had the law in view, although sometimes the terms of the 
contract will rebut this presumption. This rule, of course, 
applies as well to constitutional provisions as to statutes.'' 
(6 Cal.Jur. 310.) 
It should further be noted that the clause of the policy 
involved is one required by statute to present. It commands 
that the policy must "insure the person named therein and 
any other person using or responsible for the use of said 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied 
permission of said assured." (Veh. Code, § 415 (a) (2).) That 
section and section 402 are all part of division VII of the 
Vehicle Code, the first chapter of which declares the civil 
liability including that of the owner ( § 402), the second, 
financial responsbility, and the third, security following the 
accident. All of those provisions should be read together 
and harmonized. Thus, when the first chapter imposes lia-
bility on the owner for the negligent operation of a car by 
the one to whom he has given implied permission to use it, 
and this court interprets that to extend to the operation by 
a permittee of the permittee, although the latter permission 
is forbidden by the owner, the second chapter which requires 
an insurance policy to cover persons who operate the car 
with the owner's implied 0onsent, should be simihrrly inter. 
Aug.l952] D. I.~. GoDBEY & SoNs CoNsT. Co. v. DEANE 420 
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preted. Otherwise the policy requirement does not give the 
coverag·e demanded by the second chapter ( § 415). 
It is my opinion that this case was correctly decided by 
the opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding ,Justice Moore and 
concurred in by Mr. Justice McComb when this case was 
before the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 
'l'wo (Cal.App.), 237 P.2(1 666, and would therefore, reverse 
the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
4, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
shmtld be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22258. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1952.] 
D. L. GODBEY & SONS CONSTRUC'riON COMPANY (a 
Corporation), Appellant, v. BEN C. DEANE et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Contracts-Modification-Consideration.-Where oral modifi-
cation of written contract for cement work is made before 
performance is started, the substitution of new rights and 
duties based on a new method of computing the quantity of 
concrete is adequate consideration for relinquishment of re-
ciprocal rights of the parties under the old. 
[2] !d.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Civ. Code, § 1698, re-
lating to modification of written contracts, invalidates oral 
contracts of modification that are unexecuted and validates 
executed agreements that might otherwise fail for lack of 
consideraion. 
[3] !d.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Since in such cases as 
agreements to accept less than is due under the terms of a 
written contract, or to accept performance at a later date 
than provided in the writing, the modification agreement re-
quires no additional act or forbearance on the part of the 
obligor, it can only be executed to the extent that the obligee 
accepts performance in accordance with its terms. 
[4] !d.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Where there is con-
sideration for an oral agreement modifying a written contract, 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Contracts, § 227; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 407. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 191; [2, 4] Contracts, 
~ 189; [3] Contracts, § 190. 
